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1. Typicality, deviance and explanation 
The central idea of this paper is that of deviance: the thought that standards of various 
sorts in philosophy are determined by what is ‘typical’ (the ‘typical’ philosopher 
being a man), and that, as far as those standards are concerned, women – ‘atypical’ 
philosophers – are therefore counted as deviant in some way.2  
One problem with addressing the issue of the lack of female professional 
philosophers is that it is apt to engender the thought that it is women who are 
implicitly being told to change their ways, by becoming more like the typical (male) 
philosopher. This is an instance of a wider phenomenon that is nicely described by the 
psychologist Deborah Tannen: 
 
Some women fear, with justification, that any observation of gender 
differences will be heard as implying that it is women who are different—
different from the standard, which is whatever men are. The male is seen as 
normative, the female as departing from the norm. And it is only a short step 
— maybe an inevitable one — from ‘different’ to ‘worse’. Furthermore, if 
women’s and men's styles are shown to be different, it is usually women who 
are told to change. (1990, 14)  
 
																																																								
1 Many thanks to Michelle Bastian, Wesley Buckwalter, Melinda Fagan, Katrina Hutchison, 
Fiona Jenkins, Phyllis Rooney and Jenny Saul, all of whom provided very helpful comments 
on earlier drafts of this chapter. 
2 Similar dynamics are doubtless at work with other minorities: the ‘typical’ philosopher, at 
least in the UK, is not only male but white and middle class. However I shall restrict my 
attention to gender in this chapter. 
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The thought that ‘the male is seen as normative’ in areas where the ‘typical’ 
person in a given area is deemed to be male is backed up in a study by Miller, Taylor 
and Buck (1991). Their hypothesis was that when explanations are offered for 
differences between the behaviour of typical and atypical members of a given class, 
those explanations tend to focus on the behaviour of the atypical members. A 
preliminary study ascertained that the ‘typical’ US voter tends to be thought of as 
male. Subjects were asked to imagine the characteristics of ‘the typical American 
voter’ and either to assign a name or to assign a gender to their imagined typical 
voter. 82% of subjects assigned a male name, and 72% described the typical voter as 
male – and these percentages did not differ significantly between male and female 
subjects (ibid., 7).3 In a further study, subjects were asked to explain differences in 
turnout between male and female voters in US elections.  
 The results of the study confirmed the hypothesis. Explanations provided by 
the subjects were coded as ‘female’ – that is, focussed on explaining why women 
were more/less likely to vote (e.g. ‘perhaps women vote less frequently because the 
electoral system is a less viable means for change for women in society’) or ‘male’ 
(e.g. ‘men are more concerned about and hence involved with the power structure and 
economy’). The mean number of female explanations per subject was 1.45, and the 
mean number of male explanations was 0.4. Moreover, subjects were also asked: ‘If 
the gender gap were to disappear, would it more likely be due to: (a) men’s turnout 
rate becoming like that of women’s, or (b) women’s turnout rate becoming like that of 
men’s?’. 85% of respondents gave the latter answer: a result reminiscent of Tannen’s 
claim that ‘it is usually women who are told to change’.  
 In a further study, subjects were asked to explain the discrepancy between the 
number of doctor visits per year between men and women elementary school teachers 
(where women are regarded as typical) or college professors (where men are regarded 
as typical). There were more male explanations when the group was identified as 
elementary school teachers, and fewer female explanations, than there were when the 
																																																								
3 I ran an unscientific version of this preliminary study in my first-year logic class. In a class 
of around 100 students, about 50% of whom were female, students were asked to imagine the 
typical student who is good at logic, and either to assign a gender to them or to give them a 
name. 93% of responses assigned a male name and 76% described the typical good-at-logic 
student as male. 
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group was identified as college professors. Again, then, it was the behaviour of the 
atypical members of the group that was generally deemed to require explanation. 
What applications does this result have for the issue of the underrepresentation 
of women in philosophy? In the rest of this paper, I explore two very different areas in 
which women might be thought to be the ones who need to change. In §2, I discuss 
the combative style of informal discussion that is prevalent in philosophy. I argue that 
there is a clear distinction between style and content when it comes to philosophical 
discussions, and that an overly combative seminar style serves no philosophical 
purpose and may be alienating to (some) women. Failure to make this distinction 
naturally leads to the view that objecting to such a combative atmosphere amounts to 
holding that women just can’t cut it in the philosophical battleground: an instance of 
the view that it is women who are deviant and therefore need to raise their game.  
In §3, I discuss empirically discovered differences in philosophical intuitions 
between men and women in the context of Wesley Buckwalter and Stephen Stich’s 
(m/s) hypothesis that these differences play a role in the dwindling proportion of 
women at successive levels of undergraduate study. I argue that philosophical and 
pedagogical recommendations for the teaching of areas of philosophy where 
intuitions play a major role, and where significant gender differences emerge, come 
together. On the philosophical side, there are no grounds for ignoring significant 
differences in intuitions across different sub-populations of speakers; and on the 
pedagogical side, dealing sensitively with such differences (as opposed to, say, telling 
students who have ‘atypical’ intuitions that they are wrong) may, if Buckwalter and 
Stich are right, play a role in stemming the flow of female undergraduates away from 
philosophy courses. Attempts to lessen the ‘selection effect’ that Buckwalter and 
Stich hypothesise would thus be philosophically as well as pedagogically legitimate. 
 
2. The seminar as a philosophical battleground 
There are easier and harder issues to discuss when trying to make some progress on 
the question of why the proportion of women in philosophy drops off in the way that 
it does. Easier issues, in a sense to be explained, include those discussed by Jenny 
Saul in her contribution to this volume: implicit bias and stereotype threat. Very 
roughly, implicit bias involves regarding or treating people differently solely on the 
basis of their membership of a particular group (e.g. rating a CV with a male name 
attached higher than the same CV with a female name attached). Stereotype threat is 
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the negative effect such biases (whether real or imagined) have on the member of the 
group herself (e.g. girls who are told to colour in a picture of a doll rather than a 
landscape do worse on math tests because this reminds them that they are girls and 
they are aware that girls are stereotypically worse at math than boys).  
 These are ‘easy’ issues in the sense that (a) there is a considerable body of 
evidence that people in general – and so philosophers in particular – are subject to 
these phenomena; and, more importantly, (b) we can accept that implicit bias and 
stereotype threat exist, and suggest practical ways in which they might be mitigated or 
overcome, without even having to ask the hard question whether the relevant 
stereotype (‘women are generally worse at philosophy than men’, say) is true. The 
question whether a particular stereotype is true is a hard question for at least two 
reasons. First, stereotypes tend to be rather vaguely specified (what counts as being 
‘better’ at philosophy?), and second, given the pervasiveness of stereotype threat it is 
unclear how the truth of the stereotype could be established in practice, since any 
evidence that we might take to confirm the stereotype may itself be a result of 
stereotype threat. To use a familiar example, I don’t know whether it’s true that 
whites tend to outperform blacks on IQ tests, but let’s suppose for the sake of the 
argument that it is. This does not constitute evidence that whites are, on average, more 
intelligent than blacks, partly because it is unclear (to say the least) that IQ tests 
measure intelligence in the ordinary sense of the word (and hence the sense in play in 
the relevant stereotype), as opposed to the very specific cognitive skills that IQ test 
directly measure; and also because an IQ test is a paradigmatic stereotype-threat 
situation for blacks, so one would expect a black person with the same level of ability 
as a white person to get a lower score. 
 The point here is that, as I say, the ‘easy’ issues are easy partly because we 
can accept the reality of, and consider ways of mitigating, implicit bias and stereotype 
threat without having to ask the hard question, whether the relevant stereotype is true. 
For even if the stereotype were true, that would not in any way justify, for example, 
judging a particular woman’s job application more harshly than a similarly qualified 
man’s, or failing to attempt to reduce stereotype threat. (Even if girls were generally 
worse at maths than boys, that would be no reason not to take steps to ensure that girls 
perform to the best of their ability.) 
One question that might seem to fall in the ‘hard’ rather than the ‘easy’ 
category is whether the culture of philosophical discussion is one that tends to alienate 
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women. I shall start by discussing what I think should be an obvious distinction 
between the style and the content of philosophical discussion. I then turn to discussing 
a couple of responses that an earlier – very brief – airing of this issue by me received; 
this will connect with the discussion of §1 above, as we shall see. Finally, I return to 
the apparently ‘hard’ question just raised and argue that it is, in fact, an ‘easy’ 
question, in the sense described above. Once we grant that combative and aggressive 
behaviours are culturally deemed to be masculine behaviours – independently of 
whether this is really true – the alienating effects of such behaviours can be seen to be 
a trigger for stereotype threat. And stereotype threat, as I have said, is easy. We do not 
have to ask whether men, or male philosophers, are naturally or culturally encouraged 
to be more aggressive or combative than women or than female philosophers; that 
question does not need to be answered in order to argue that a combative seminar 
style can be alienating for women. 
In 2009, The Philosophers’ Magazine ran a story about the low proportion of 
women in UK philosophy departments, to which I contributed a couple of sound-
bites. Here is a passage from the article: 
 
Helen Beebee, a University of Birmingham lecturer and director of the British 
Philosophical Association (BPA) … says her impression is that there are 
roughly equal numbers of men and women graduating with good bachelor 
degrees in philosophy and that the numbers of women start to drop off at MA 
level and then again at PhD level. Beebee says this tapering off of women may 
be at least partly caused by a culture of aggressive argument that is particular 
to philosophy and which begins to become more prominent at postgraduate 
level. ‘I can remember being a PhD student and giving seminar papers and just 
being absolutely terrified that I was going to wind up intellectually beaten to a 
pulp by the audience,’ she says. ‘I can easily imagine someone thinking, “this 
is just ridiculous, why would I want to pursue a career where I open myself up 
to having my work publicly trashed on a regular basis?” ’ (Lewis 2009) 
 
These comments provoked a somewhat unfriendly response on a couple of philosophy 
blogs, to which I shall return shortly. Rather than remove my head from above the 
parapet, however, I would like to explain just what I had in mind, and why I think 
there is a legitimate concern here. 
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 There is an extent to which philosophy is, in its nature, an adversarial 
discipline. By and large, philosophers cannot prove any theorems; nor can we appeal 
to empirical data to justify our claims. Our arguments typically rely on assumptions 
that are not beyond reproach, and the arguments themselves often fall short of 
deductive validity. When we present a paper at a conference or seminar, normally we 
present such an argument; and our audience is entitled to assume that as far as we are 
aware, the argument starts from plausible premises and, given those premises, is 
reasonably convincing.  
 What we tend to find, however – and of course this is a large part of the point 
of presenting one’s work to an audience – is that the argument was less convincing 
than we realised. It often turns out that our premises are more controversial than we 
thought, or that we have equivocated at a crucial point, or that there is a counter-
example to our conclusion, or that the argument licenses only a weaker conclusion 
than the one we have drawn, or whatever. And of course we only find these useful 
things out if people draw our attention to them. Hence the claim that philosophy is, to 
some extent, adversarial in nature: it is a large, and entirely proper, part of the 
philosophical enterprise to point out to people where they have gone wrong. 
 I do not object to any of this. What I want to claim, however, is that seminar 
discussions frequently enshrine a confrontational attitude that is entirely separable 
from the philosophical content of those discussions. There is all the difference in the 
world between, on the one hand, raising an objection in a friendly and constructive 
manner and, on the other, raising it in a manner (by choice of words, body language 
and so on) that suggests that you think the objection is just obvious, and hence that the 
speaker must not be very clever, having failed to spot it for themselves. Similarly, I 
am certain that most readers will have come across at least one philosopher who – if 
not kept on a sufficiently short leash by the chair – will continue to harangue the 
speaker on a particular point long after it is obvious to everyone in the room that the 
questioner’s criticism is a good one and that the speaker is not going to be able to 
think up a convincing off-the-cuff rejoinder. No philosophical purpose is served by 
this kind of behaviour. 
Or consider how rarely members of the audience make constructive 
suggestions: ‘perhaps you could say this in response to the previous question’, or 
‘actually maybe your argument licenses and even stronger conclusion’, or whatever; 
or how rarely participants preface their question with a compliment about the paper 
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(‘I enjoyed that’, or ‘I thought what you said about X was interesting’). Of course, 
some philosophers take the view that such niceties are social conventions that have no 
place in the robust pursuit of the truth. (I myself used to take that view, and still find it 
unnatural to put the speaker at their ease before launching into my objection – so 
much so that I unfortunately very rarely remember to do it.) But in a seminar setting 
social conventions are always in play whether we like it or not: truth cannot be 
pursued but through the medium of conversation, and conversation is a social 
phenomenon. And of course social conventions are not set in stone: in principle, we 
could choose to make the atmosphere in our seminars more supportive, and to regard 
the pursuit of truth is a matter of collaboration between speaker and audience rather 
than conflict.  
Indeed, a more collaborative atmosphere may positively aid the pursuit of 
truth. I would bet that many audience members in seminars that have a combative 
atmosphere have questions that they would like to ask, but they do not do so because 
they are not completely confident that they have fully understood the point at issue 
and are afraid of looking ‘dumb’ (as opposed to looking ‘smart’ – see Saul (XX)). 
This is especially likely to be the case for research students and temporary staff who 
may assume that their performance will be taken into account in letters of reference or 
judgments of suitability for future posts in the department. But – in the absence of any 
reason to think there is a close correlation between being confident that one has 
understood the point and actually having understood the point – an atmosphere that 
encourages rather than discourages people to participate might well turn up some 
excellent points that would otherwise remain unheard. And the worst that can happen 
is that the questioner hasn’t understood, and a couple of minutes are spent setting 
them straight. This may not aid the collective pursuit of truth, but it certainly benefits 
the questioner – something that ought to be seen as a good thing and not merely a 
waste of everyone else’s time. 
The idea that the philosophy seminar is to be seen as a form of combat is not, 
thankfully, explicitly embraced very often, so far as I can tell. But it does exist. An 
example that I gave in the TPM article is of a (senior male) member of staff keeping a 
tally of ‘home wins’ and ‘away wins’ on the whiteboard in his office, and initiating 
discussion in the pub (not in the presence of the speaker, I’m happy to say) of which 
category the most recent seminar fell under. (I think they were virtually all home 
wins.) Another example, I think – and a more common one – is the idea that it is a 
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philosophical weakness not to be able to think of an immediate, off-the-cuff decisive 
response to an objection, and instead to commit to giving the objection further 
thought later. The ability to think fast on one’s feet is doubtless an intellectual virtue 
of sorts, but I can see no reason to think that it is a specifically philosophical virtue. 
The pursuit of philosophical truth is not hindered in any way by its taking someone a 
few hours, rather than ten seconds, to think of a plausible rejoinder. Similarly, I have 
been surprised by the extent to which responses that manifestly and deliberately do 
not answer the question posed, but rather speak to a slightly different, easier one, are 
favourably regarded, as though they constitute admirable strategic manoeuvres in the 
face of enemy forces. Again, no philosophical virtue is being exhibited here; quite the 
reverse, in fact. 
The adversarial nature of philosophical discussion has been discussed at some 
length by feminist philosophers. Trudy Govier, for example, distinguishes between 
‘minimal’ and ‘ancilliary adversariality’, which more or less maps on to the 
distinction made above between content and style – minimal adversariality being the 
kind of adversariality I earlier described as part and parcel of the philosophical 
enterprise, and ancilliary adversariality being the kind of aggressive and combative 
behaviour that is entirely separable from the robust pursuit of truth that philosophical 
argument is supposed to be aimed at (Govier 1999, especially 244-6). 
Phyllis Rooney (2010), while broadly sympathetic to Govier’s distinction, 
argues that even Govier’s description of minimal adversariality enshrines an 
‘argument-as-war’ metaphor that misdescribes the dialectical situation by using terms 
such as ‘opponent’ and ‘conflict’, and hence that the minimal/ancilliary distinction 
(and perhaps by extension my content/style distinction) is ‘more porous than we 
might initially think’ (2010, 222): 
 
War-like metaphors (shooting down points, attacking positions and persons, 
going after fatal flaws, and so on), often enacted more explicitly and 
problematically with ancillary adversariality, have their less bellicose 
cousins—but cousins still—in the minimal adversariality informing basic 
understandings and descriptions of argument and argumentation. They do so 
to the extent that … we barely recognize them as such, even when they are 
characterizing argument situations in epistemically erroneous and confusing 
ways. (ibid.) 
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Part of Rooney’s point, then, is that the argument-as-war metaphor cuts a lot 
deeper than is normally recognised.4 Just one (but by no means the only) aspect of 
this is that we tend to conceive of face-to-face arguments in philosophy as things to be 
won and lost: ‘I lose the argument and you win … But surely I am the one who has 
made the epistemic gain, however small. I have replaced a probably false belief with 
a probably true one, and you have made no such gain’ (2010, 222). Again, the thought 
here is that the way in which we often conceive seminar-based philosophical 
discussion is actually in tension with our own self-image as seekers after the truth: the 
epistemic gain that should be our goal is supplanted by the aim of winning the battle. 
Right at the start of my first-year logic course, I tell the students that the sense of 
‘argument’ at work in logic in particular, and in philosophy in general, is different to 
the more usual sense of ‘argument’, as in ‘having an argument with’ someone. They 
would doubtless find that claim hard to square with the way in which many 
professional philosophy seminar discussions are actually conducted. 
My favourite example of a hostile style – though admittedly not in the context 
of a seminar – is a blog response that the passage quoted above elicited from a 
professional philosopher: 
 
Helen Beebee, though I’m sure you’re a wonderful director of the BPA, please 
think of handing over the reigns [sic] … you don’t know the first thing about 
(a) the fallacious use of anecdotal evidence, (b) the problems of shitty causal 
inferences that (c) reinforce naturalist assumptions dominant in the culture. 
And (d) please tell me that you don’t think the problem is that women can’t 
cut it. Because men like getting their work trashed?  
Or better: maybe if we had more women in place at various 
universities, you know, getting hired, as Saul suggests, we could find someone 
to head the BPA (male or female or non-normed gender) who can ‘easily 
imagine’ ways to work for different modes of philosophizing, say, as head of 																																																								4	As may be obvious, I only discovered (a small corner of) the large feminist philosophy 
literature on this topic after this paper was substantially written; hence I am doing little more 
than drawing the reader’s attention to it here, rather than discussing it in detail. See Rooney 
2010 for many additional references. 
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something like the BPA … Now instead of asking – from what you can ‘easily 
imagine’ – what a PhD student would be thinking, how about asking about a 
culture that needs to be changed so you can ‘easily imagine’ this?5 
 
The wonderful irony of this response is of course that it exhibits (in admittedly 
a rather extreme form) precisely the kind of culture of aggressive argument to which I 
was alluding: the response to the claim that ‘this tapering off of women may be at 
least partly caused by a culture of aggressive argument that is particular to 
philosophy’ is to accuse me of being, in effect, woefully ignorant and professionally 
incompetent. 
Another blog post commenting on the article, by Brian Leiter, runs as follows: 
 
… some female philosophers in the UK [suggest] that the aggressive, 
argumentative style of philosophy drives women out. A female philosopher … 
found this … explanation (quite correctly) demeaning to women …6 
 
This passage, it seems to me, fails to make just the distinction between style and 
content that I have been urging. Philosophy does – in its nature – have an 
‘argumentative’ style in the sense that philosophical claims are established by means 
of argument, and seminar questions are normally themselves arguments to the effect 
that the speaker has made a false or unwarranted or ambiguous claim. But this does 
not, of course, entail that philosophical discussion is inherently, or ought to be, 
‘argumentative’ in the ordinary sense of the word: pursued in a manner that is 
belligerent, competitive, nit-picking, or whatever. Nor, obviously, is there anything 
inherently ‘aggressive’ about an ‘argumentative’ style in the first sense: there are 
nicer and less nice ways of telling someone that she has appealed to an implausible 
premise, or that her view is subject to a counter-example, or whatever. So to describe 
‘the’ style of philosophy as an ‘aggressive, argumentative style’ is to fail to 																																																								
5 Quoted from philosophyinatimeoferror.wordpress.com/2009/09/07/women-in-philosophy/ 
(accessed 11 August 2010). 
6 Leiter Reports, leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2009/10/situation-for-women-in-philosophy-
makes-the-ny-times.html (accessed 11 August 2010). I should point out that Leiter later 
published a clarification of the position I was defending (along the lines described here) at my 
request. 
	 11	
distinguish the argumentative substance of philosophical discussion from the 
aggressive style in which that argumentative substance is often pursued. 
 These two responses to the TPM article relate to the discussion in §1 of some 
findings in psychology. Recall that the point there was that explanations for the 
differences between ‘typical’ and ‘atypical’ members of a group (US voters and 
college professors, for example) tend to focus on features of the atypical group, with 
the assumption – explicit in the case of the experiment concerning US voters – that it 
is the members of the atypical group whose behaviour is deviant. (Recall that 85% of 
subjects thought that a change in the gender gap in voting behaviour would be due to 
the women’s turnout rate becoming like that of the men.) 
 It seems to me that this kind of phenomenon might lie behind the blog 
responses described above, in the following sense. The authors took me to be 
suggesting that ‘women can’t cut it’ in philosophy – a claim that is ‘demeaning to 
women’. This interpretation seems to presuppose that an aggressive style is somehow 
inherent in the philosophical enterprise. I have already argued that that is a mistake; 
however, the question is, why would someone make that mistake? One answer might 
be that what is in fact a typical feature of philosophical discussion is implicitly 
assumed to be a good thing: the typical feature (viz, an aggressive argument style) is 
seen as ‘normative’ (to use Tannen’s expression). This being so, my suggestion that 
that typical feature might be off-putting to women is then read as claiming that 
women are deviant – they depart from the norm. And, as Tannen says, ‘it is only a 
short step — maybe an inevitable one — from “different” to “worse” ’. Hence the 
inclination to read my suggestion as ‘demeaning’ to women – an interpretation that, 
as should be obvious, was not intended. 
 I have not yet addressed the question with which I started this section: whether 
the somewhat combative atmosphere of (what is in my experience) the typical 
philosophy seminar is, in fact, one that tends to alienate women. This is of course an 
empirical question; and it may seem to fall into the ‘hard’ category identified earlier, 
since it would appear to be a question about the truth of a stereotype (the stereotype in 
this case being that women are more averse to aggressive styles of argument than men 
are). But I want to suggest that the first question can be answered affirmatively 
without addressing the question about the truth of the stereotype. So the relationship 
between the two questions is a little like the relationship between ‘do girls tend to 
perform worse than boys in math tests?’ and ‘are girls worse than boys at math?’. The 
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answer to the first question is ‘yes’ (in stereotype threat-provoking situations at least) 
– and this is so independently of whether the answer to the second question is ‘yes’ or 
‘no’. 
 As with the math test case, we need to set the issue in the context of the kinds 
of psychological influences to which female students (and staff) are exposed to 
outside of the seminar room. As Saul argues in her contribution to his volume, 
implicit bias is a pervasive feature of working environments, and there are no grounds 
for thinking that the philosophy seminar room is an exception. In addition, however, 
there is evidence that a range of more specific biases are at work within the sciences; 
and, as a discipline that bears some similarity to the sciences – both (at least in some 
areas of philosophy) intellectually and (in most areas) in terms of the under-
representation of women – it is reasonable to assume that similar biases are at work in 
philosophy. In particular, there is plenty of empirical evidence that in the sciences, 
women are typically exposed to a vast array of influences that can make them feel 
uncomfortable, or even unwanted, in their chosen discipline (see Seymour and Hewitt 
1997 and Margolis and Fisher 2003). These influences start early and can persist 
through their studies and beyond, and include not only implicit biases of various kinds 
(women are inherently worse at science; female science students are less attractive 
than their arts counterparts; women who do well get there through sheer hard work 
(bad) rather than natural aptitude (good); etc.) but also, in some cases, outright sexism 
from their peers and teachers.  
Of course, the circumstances of philosophy are not identical to those of 
sciences such as mathematics, engineering and computer science. For example, as far 
as I know, philosophy doesn’t have the ‘geek’ image that mathematics, physics and 
computer science have; and philosophy is perhaps not seen as an intrinsically solitary, 
anti-social activity in the way that computer science is seen. So in these respects, 
philosophy may be less stereotypically ‘male’ than some of the sciences. On the other 
hand, the (by now historically uncontroversial) conception of reason as a distinctively 
male attribute is likely to play more of a role in philosophy than in other disciplines, 
including the sciences.7 This is partly because reasoning simpliciter (as opposed to, 																																																								
7 See for example Genevieve Lloyd’s The Man of Reason: ‘Male’ and ‘Female’ in Western 
Philosophy (1984). See also Sally Haslanger’s (2008) application of Virginia Valian’s (1998) 
notion of a ‘schema’ to the case of philosophy. 
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say, mathematical reasoning) is – or is generally regarded as – the cornerstone of 
philosophical methodology (or at any rate, it is in the areas of philosophy that I am 
familiar with), and partly also because reason is itself a part of the subject matter of 
philosophy. 
 Nor, in my experience, are professional philosophers in general prone to overt 
sexism; but it does exist. In particular, we need to remember that even if professional 
philosophers are immune from overt sexism, our students may not be. Two examples 
spring to mind, both of which I heard from the female students concerned. First, a 
female Masters student, having presented a paper at a postgraduate conference – 
indeed she was the only female presenter – was told afterwards by a male student 
from a prestigious British university that her paper was ‘quite good for a girl’. 
Second, in a postgraduate seminar a male PhD student made more than one comment 
– audible to everyone – about the size of a female PhD student’s breasts. These 
comments were met with an uncomfortable silence – but no comment or intervention 
– from the other students (all male) or the (male) member of staff chairing the 
seminar. (This is not to say that he condoned the student’s behaviour; I suspect he was 
so shocked that he was literally lost for words. But of course the students may have 
interpreted his failure to intervene differently.)8  
 At least some female philosophers, then, will have been subject to these kinds 
of influences to a greater or lesser extent during their studies – on top of the usual 
implicit biases that appear to exist within the general population. In that context, and 
given that it is surely uncontroversial that aggression and competitiveness are 
culturally associated with a masculine environment, exhibiting those traits in 
philosophical discussions is liable to provoke stereotype threat. 
 In her contribution to this volume, Saul focuses on the effects that stereotype 
threat has on performance (see Saul, §2.5, for a nice anecdotal description of the 
experience and effect on performance of stereotype threat in the seminar room). Here, 
however, I want to focus not on any effect on seminar performance that stereotype 																																																								
8 Doubtless we would all like to think that cases such as these are rare and unfortunate 
exceptions to the normally entirely non-sexist behaviour of our colleagues and students. (For 
more such rare and unfortunate exceptions, see beingawomaninphilosophy.wordpress.com.) 
We might even believe that such behaviour would never take place in our own institution. 
However, it’s worth asking oneself how likely one would be to find out about it if it did 
happen in one’s own institution. 
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threat might engender (failing to give good answers to questions, say, or being less 
fluent in one’s presentation), but on its broader psychological effects.  
 If you are a professional philosopher, consider the number of occasions in 
your professional life that you have been in a situation in which you have been the 
only member of an easily identifiable social category. If you are white, able-bodied 
and male, the answer is likely to be ‘hardly ever’. If you are a woman (or black, or 
disabled), the answer is likely to be ‘more times than I can count’.9 Such situations 
might include, for example, being the only female candidate being interviewed for a 
job, being the only woman in the seminar room, being the only female member of 
staff in one’s department, being the only female speaker at a conference, and being 
the only woman on a university committee. 
 Such situations are ones in which stereotype threat is a very real possibility, 
and it can manifest itself in a number of ways. First, you can feel that you are 
representing women philosophers in general. You might feel that a bad performance 
in a job interview, say, if you’re the only female candidate, will simply reinforce the 
relevant stereotype, and of course this is probably not something you will want to 
happen. So – independently of whether your performance is affected – you are under 
additional pressure, relative to your male peers. As Claude Steele notes: 
 
when you realise that this stressful experience is probably a chronic feature of the 
setting for you, it can be difficult for you to stay in the setting, to sustain your 
motivation to succeed there. Disproving a stereotype is a Sisyphean task; 
something you have to do over and over again as long as you are in the domain 
where the stereotype applies. (2010, 111) 
 
 Second, stereotype threat can operate in unconscious ways. Steele notes that 
when black students who underperformed in a stereotype threat situation were asked 
about how they felt while performing the test, they ‘reported no more anxiety than 
those not under stereotype threat’ (2010, 117). But when the standard physiological 
indicator of stress and anxiety is measured – raised blood pressure – it turns out that 
those in stereotype threat situations do indeed show raised blood pressure (2010, 118-																																																								9	Of course there are more relevant social categories than I have listed here. In the UK, for 
example, one might add: having a strong working-class or northern English accent.	
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9). Moreover, there is a correlation between cognitive load and stability of heartbeat: 
the greater the cognitive load, the more stable the heartbeat. Again, those in 
stereotype threat situations display a more stable heartbeat than those who are not, 
indicating that stereotype threat induces an additional cognitive load. As Steele puts 
it, ‘our minds race … We are defending ourselves and coping with the threat of being 
stereotyped. We’re probably aware of some of this defending and coping. But much 
of the time we may miss it, unless we try very hard to listen’ (2010, 123).  
 Let’s put all of this together. By and large, given the general lack of women in 
philosophy from postgraduate level onwards, and given that philosophy itself is an 
arena within which being female constitutes a negative stereotype, philosophy 
seminars are already pretty likely to be stereotype threat situations for women. Add in 
a dose of aggressive – and thus stereotypically male – behaviour (remember: it 
doesn’t matter whether or not the stereotype is true), and you make the situation 
worse for the women in the room by drawing attention to their gender, thereby 
increasing the threat. (Remember, doing or saying anything that might suggest that 
you think women are worse at philosophy than men is not needed, any more than 
seven-year-old girls need to be told that girls are worse at maths in order to 
underperform on the maths test. They just need to be reminded that they are girls.) 
You may or may not thereby cause them to underperform, or to keep the question 
they really want to ask to themselves, but you will probably increase their stress 
levels, whether they are aware of it or not. Add the fact that female graduate students 
in the room will be imagining themselves being the future target, as a speaker, of this 
kind of behaviour. Now repeat on a regular basis. Arguably, what you have is a 
recipe, or at least a part of a recipe, for discouraging women from staying in the 
profession. As Steele says, ‘when you realise that this stressful experience is probably 
a chronic feature of the setting for you, it can be difficult for you to stay in the setting, 
to sustain your motivation to succeed there’.10 
																																																								10	Of course, it’s an empirical question which (if any) situations trigger stereotype threat, and 
exactly what effects that has (if it exists) on women philosophers. However, the phenomenon 
has been found in a wide range of social groups (including white males) and stereotypes 
(from sporting prowess to mathematical ability) – see Steele 2010 – so there is every reason 
to think that it applies to philosophy. I am of course speculating about which specific 
situations trigger stereotype threat, but the seminar would seem to meet the required 
conditions. 
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 The hard question remains, of course: do women in fact, in general – or 
perhaps just more often than their male colleagues – find the aggressive and 
competitive atmosphere that is often present in the philosophy seminar uncongenial, 
independently of any effect it may have via stereotype threat? I do not know the 
answer to that question. I myself do not enjoy being on the receiving end of 
aggressive and competitive behaviour, and, unlike Brian Leiter’s anonymous source, 
do not feel in the least bit demeaned by that confession. On the contrary: on my own 
personal list of thick moral concepts, these both fall under ‘vice’ rather than ‘virtue’. I 
cannot, of course, speak for others. But my point here has been that there are grounds 
for thinking that such an atmosphere is alienating for women – and hence good 
reasons to attempting to change the atmosphere of the seminar room when it is 
aggressive or competitive – whatever the answer to the hard question; so it is one that 
we can simply allow to lapse. The role of such an atmosphere in the pursuit of truth is, 
at best, neutral; at worst, it runs the risk of putting women off philosophy – thereby 
reinforcing the stereotype that philosophy is a man’s world. 
 
3. Conceptual analysis, experimental philosophy, and deviant intuitions 
In this section, I switch attention to the fields of conceptual analysis and experimental 
philosophy. I shall summarise some findings in recent studies concerning gender 
differences in philosophical intuitions when it comes to standard philosophical 
thought experiments, and briefly discuss the importance of these findings for 
understanding one possible route to disengagement from philosophy by female 
undergraduates. I’ll argue that, from both philosophical and pedagogical points of 
view, the findings strongly suggest that we should be wary of dismissing the 
intuitions of our students when they differ from our own. We have good reasons not 
to treat students with differing intuitions as though they are obviously mistaken or 
wrongheaded or just don’t get it: from a philosophical point of view, we should not 
think of philosophical intuitions as akin to experimental observations, since this 
(modulo certain assumptions) is incompatible with the finding that there are 
significant gender differences in intuitions. And, pedagogically, treating students’ 
‘deviant’ intuitions in this way is likely to discourage some able students, and perhaps 
more women than men. 
A standard project in analytic philosophy since the early 20th Century has been 
that of conceptual analysis: the project of discovering the meanings of ordinary-
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language expressions that are philosophically interesting or problematic (‘morally 
wrong’, ‘free’, ‘knowledge’, ‘cause’, and so on). A standard part of the methodology 
for finding a plausible conceptual analysis of a given term is the deployment of 
‘intuition’, often in the context of a thought experiment. Thus for example Edmund 
Gettier (1963) argued that knowledge is not (contrary to received philosophical 
opinion at the time) a matter of justified true belief on the basis of a thought 
experiment in which, as every undergraduate knows, Smith has the justified true 
belief that Jones owns a Ford but, intuitively, does not know that Jones owns a Ford. 
Such intuitions are generally arrived at from the armchair, and their claim to being 
‘normal’ or reliable or widely shared is typically measured by the rather dubious 
method of stating what, ‘intuitively’, is the right thing to say, and then sitting back 
and waiting to see whether anyone objects. 
Recently, however, ‘experimental philosophy’ has become hugely popular. 
One (though not the only) aspect of experimental philosophy is, precisely, to put 
standard thought experiments to the test, to ascertain whether, or to what extent, 
philosophers’ armchair claims about what is intuitively correct or plausible (e.g. the 
claim that Smith does not know that Jones owns a Ford) are, in fact, widely shared in 
the general population (or rather, typically, in populations of undergraduates taking 
philosophy classes). The thought here – plausibly enough – is that if a philosopher is 
making a claim about the meaning of an ordinary-language term (such as ‘knows’), 
then that claim will only be plausible if in fact sufficiently many speakers of the 
language – and not merely some small number of professional philosophers who 
happen to be publishing papers on the topic – share their intuitions. 
While it is perhaps not surprising that results of actual empirical experiments 
typically show that the general population (indeed even a group philosophy 
undergraduates) rarely delivers a unanimous verdict, one perhaps unexpected result 
has been that, in a range of cases, there are significant differences between different 
sub-populations. For example, Machery, Mallen, Nichols and Stich (2004) found that 
there are differences in philosophical intuitions between East Asians and Westerners 
when it comes to the intuitions that underpin standard competing theories of 
reference.11 In a recent paper, Wesley Buckwalter and Stephen Stich (m/s) survey a 
																																																								
11 For a critical discussion of what exactly Machery et al’s experiments show, see Martí 2009. 
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large number of empirically-tested philosophical thought experiments that reveal 
significant differences in intuitions between men and women across a wide range of 
topics, such as knowledge, free will, physicalism and utilitarianism, and including 
standard cases such as the Trolley Problem, Brains in a Vat, and the Chinese Room. 
In a separate paper, Buckwalter (m/s) finds differences between men and women 
concerning whether moral features of a situation can determine causal and epistemic 
differences: roughly, men are more likely than women to judge moral features (in 
particular, whether the outcome is good or bad) to be irrelevant to attributions of 
causation or knowledge. 
Buckwalter and Stich advance the hypothesis that this kind of phenomenon is 
at least partly responsible for the dwindling in women’s enrolment in philosophy 
courses as they progress through their undergraduate programme. (They provide data 
for one US philosophy department, where the proportion of women drops from 46.2% 
in 100-level introductory courses to 29.3% in 400-level courses.) As they put it: 
 
But now consider the predicament of a young woman in a philosophy class, 
who (like 71% - 75% of women in the Starmans and Friedman [m/s] study) 
does not find it obvious that the characters in Gettier vignettes do not have 
knowledge of the relevant proposition. Rather, her intuitions tell her that the 
Gettier characters do have knowledge, though her instructor, whether male or 
female, as well as a high percentage of her male classmates, clearly think she 
is mistaken. Different women will, of course, react to a situation like this in 
different ways. But it is plausible to suppose that some women facing this 
predicament will be puzzled or uncomfortable or angry or confused or just 
plain bored. If any or all of these alienating effects are the case, she may be 
less likely to take another philosophy course than a male student who (like 
59% - 64% of the men in the Starmans and Friedman study) have the 
‘standard’ intuitions that their instructor has, and who can actively participate 
in, and perhaps even enjoy, the project of hunting for a theory that captures 
‘our’ intuitions. (m/s, §4) 
 
Buckwalter and Stich thus suggest that ‘part of the gender gap in academic 
philosophy can be explained as a selection effect’ (ibid.). Given that the majority of a 
female undergraduate’s teachers will be men, her intuitions have a higher chance than 
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do those of her male peers of conflicting with her teacher’s intuitions; and of course 
the more philosophy courses she takes, the more frequently she is likely to encounter 
this phenomenon. 
The extent to which this suggestion is plausible depends on a variety of 
factors. One important factor is the extent to which the gender difference in intuitions 
persists at the level of philosophy teachers. For example, take the intuitions about 
knowledge elicited by Starmans and Friedman. Exactly how much more likely is a 
female student’s intuitive judgement than a male’s to differ from those of her teacher? 
That depends on how likely it is that her teacher has the intuition that the Gettier case 
is (contra Gettier) a case of knowledge. If we assume that teachers’ intuitions exhibit 
the same gender difference as students’, the answer is: not much. Assume that 60% of 
male students and teachers, but only 30% of female students and teachers, think it is a 
case of knowledge, and that 25% of philosophy teachers are women. Then the chance 
that a female student’s intuition will be the same as her teacher’s is 48.7%, and the 
chance that a male student’s intuition will be the same as his teacher’s is only a bit 
higher: 50.7%. That would suggest that the selection effect is in fact not very 
significant. 
On the other hand, very, very few philosophy teachers are likely to actually 
endorse the view that knowledge is, after all, justified true belief. If we assume that, 
say, 95% of philosophy teachers think that the Gettier case really isn’t, intuitively, a 
case of knowledge – irrespective of their gender – then the selection effect is much 
more pronounced: the chance that a female student’s intuition will be the same as her 
teacher’s is 32%, and the chance that a male student’s intuition will be the same as his 
teacher’s is nearly twice as high: 59%. However, in other thought experiments, the 
intuitions that were more prevalent amongst female than male students have some 
claim (unlike in the Gettier case) to being the ‘standard’ intuition in the philosophical 
literature, specifically in the Brain in a Vat and Twin Earth thought experiments. In 
those cases, it is male students, rather than female, who are statistically more likely to 
have different intuitions to their teachers. 
While the investigation of both the relative extent and the effects of ‘intuition 
clashes’ between female students and their teachers has a long way to go yet, for the 
purposes of the rest of this chapter I shall assume both that such intuition clashes are 
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more prevalent amongst female students than amongst their male peers, 12 and that 
Buckwalter and Stich are right in claiming that this plays a role in explaining the 
drop-off of female students as they progress through their undergraduate career.13 My 
interest in the rest of this chapter will be in the philosophical consequences and 
pedagogical recommendations that arise from this assumption. 
Let’s begin with the philosophical consequences. Intuitions that have different 
rates of prevalence amongst different subpopulations (whether distinguished 
according to gender, ethnic background, or whatever) are philosophically 
problematic.14 On the one hand, intuitions are often taken to be analogous to scientific 
observation; as Ernest Sosa puts it, ‘the way intuition is supposed to function in 
epistemology and in philosophy more generally … is by analogy with the way 
observation is supposed to function in empirical science’ (2009, 107; quoted in 
Buckwalter and Stich m/s, §4). This conception of the role of philosophical intuition 
encourages the view that one’s own considered intuitions, or perhaps those of the 
majority, are the right ones to have, and so anyone who disagrees is making a 
mistake: perhaps they have, as Ned Block nicely puts it, a ‘tin ear’ (see Buckwalter 
and Stich m/s, n.24). On the other hand, one would not want to respond to variation 
between subpopulations by adopting an ‘anything-goes’ view, according to which all 
intuitions are equally valid. 
One compelling reason for wanting to avoid the latter response – the 
‘anything-goes’ view – as a general principle is that some ‘folk’ intuitions are simply 																																																								12	I have been persuaded by Louise Antony that this assumption is a lot more contentious 
than I had previously thought; nonetheless, I think it is worth exploring its consequences, 
even if, ultimately, it turns out to be mistaken.	
13 Of course, this only applies in cases where (unlike, say, most English universities) 
undergraduates can choose between philosophy and non-philosophy courses. However, if 
Buckwalter and Stich are right about such cases, then presumably at universities where 
students are locked in to their philosophy degree programme at an early stage, the selection 
effect will be present but will have a delayed practical effect: women students cannot vote 
with their feet until they graduate and decide whether to continue to graduate study in 
philosophy. In the UK, there is a markedly lower proportion of women studying philosophy at 
Masters level than the proportion who get an undergraduate degree (see [*REF to earlier stats 
here]).  
14 Indeed, the mere fact that intuitions vary amongst the general population is itself 
philosophically problematic: ignoring gender differences, if only about half of philosophy 
undergraduates think that Smith doesn’t know that Jones owns a Ford, where does that leave 
the claim that it is intuitively compelling that knowledge isn’t justified true belief? 
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not apt for accommodation in any remotely plausible philosophical theory. One 
example – presented but not discussed in Buckwalter and Stich’s paper – comes from 
a study by Zamzow and Nichols (2009) involving the Trolley Problem. Subjects are 
presented with a vignette in which five people can be saved by flipping a switch, 
thereby diverting a runaway train onto a side track, which would unfortunately result 
in the death of one person who is standing on the side track and would not have time 
to get out of the way. Should you sacrifice the one for the sake of the five? In one 
version of the case, subjects were asked to imagine that the person standing on the 
side track was their brother or sister. The results showed a gender difference: when 
responding to the claim ‘it is morally acceptable for me to pull the switch’ on a scale 
from 1 (‘strongly disagree’) to 7 (‘strongly agree’), men’s ratings were on average 
lower in the brother case than were women’s, and vice versa in the sister case. Of 
course, no sensible moral theory will endorse the claim that if you’re a woman it is 
better to save your sister than your brother, but if you’re a man the reverse holds. 
Whatever the psychological explanation for the difference displayed by Zamzow and 
Nichols’ subjects, the resulting intuitions are unsuited for taking as data on the basis 
of which to formulate a philosophical theory. 
A second reason for resisting the ‘anything-goes’ view – or rather, a 
motivation for resisting it – is that it leaves the whole project of conceptual analysis in 
a very difficult position. If we take seriously the differences in intuition between men 
and women (or Westerners and East Asians, or whoever) concerning, say, knowledge, 
it seems that we are forced to conclude that there is no univocal concept of 
knowledge, such that it is susceptible to conceptual analysis.  
Whether that is indeed the conclusion we should draw – and whether, or to 
what extent, a very standard ingredient of the method of analytic philosophy therefore 
needs to be revised or abandoned – is not a question I intend to try and resolve here. I 
myself remain optimistic that conceptual analysis still has a legitimate and important 
role to play in philosophical method. On the other hand, given the apparently 
pervasive gender differences in intuitions, it seems that it would be unwise, 
philosophically speaking, to take for granted the view that philosophical intuition is, 
as Sosa suggests, akin to scientific observation. For that would seem to lead us either 
to a kind of relativism that most analytic philosophers would not want to endorse – 
basically, in the current context, the view that men and women literally speak 
different languages (e.g. they mean different things by ‘know’) – or else to the view 
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that either male or female students are more susceptible to having a tin ear. And of 
course it’s hard to see how this latter view might be justified on either philosophical 
or empirical grounds. In particular, there is no independent way of establishing which 
of the rival intuitions is the ‘wrong’ one: one cannot, unfortunately, make an 
appointment with the intuition-equivalent of an optician and take a tin-ear test. 
If the claim that intuitions should not be conceived as akin to scientific 
observation is right, then – fortunately – it motivates a pedagogical approach to 
thought experiments and intuitions that might help to mitigate the ‘selection effect’ 
hypothesized by Buckwalter and Stich. We can take care to make it clear to students 
that minority intuitions, or ones that conflict with our own, are not thereby 
automatically mistaken or indicative of a tin ear, for example by not saying 
‘obviously …’, or ‘you’d be crazy to deny that …’. We can take the time to explore 
the philosophical implications of their intuitions rather than dismissing them and 
moving on. (For example, if you teach Gettier in such a way as to suggest that those 
students who think that Smith knows that Jones owns a Ford have a tin ear, that’s 
likely to be around 40% of your male students and 60% of your female students who 
are in danger of thinking that they are tin-eared and therefore unsuited to 
philosophical study.) Or, at least, we can point them in the direction of respectable 
philosophical literature that sides with them rather than us.  
These are small adjustments to class discussion, curricula and reading lists that 
anyone can implement without too much difficulty. To the extent that students are 
likely to become alienated or confused by the implication that their intuitions are off-
key, they are adjustments that will benefit a sizeable proportion of students, whatever 
their gender, ethnicity, or whatever (again, if you’re teaching Gettier to entry-level 
philosophy students, about half of the class simply won’t find it obvious that Smith 
doesn’t know that Jones owns a Ford). If they also help to reduce the sense that 
women in philosophy are ‘deviant’ – in this case by having the wrong intuitions – 
then that is surely a good thing. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter has made two really quite small recommendations, which may be 
summed up as: ‘no aggressive behaviour in the seminar room, please’ and ‘don’t 
casually dismiss the intuitions of your students when they disagree with you’. In the 
first case, the aggressive, competitive, and occasionally downright hostile atmosphere 
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in professional philosophy seminars is, I have argued, a contingent feature of (some) 
philosophical discussions: it is entirely separable from robust philosophical criticism, 
and plays no useful role in the pursuit of truth. Failure to grasp this fact, I think, is – at 
least in some cases – due to an illicit slide between the normal and the normative: the 
discomfort that such an atmosphere can create in a speaker or audience member may 
not be statistically normal, but it is not thereby deviant in the normative sense that it is 
the discomfited person who is at fault for being inappropriately thin-skinned. And it is 
women who are the most likely to be discomfited, since it is women who, when 
situated in culturally masculine environment, are liable to be subject to stereotype 
threat. 
 In the second case, I have urged that non-standard intuitive responses to 
thought experiments should not automatically be regarded as deviant. To treat 
students’ intuitions in the classroom as mistaken or a sign of philosophical bad 
judgement (or taste) is philosophically unjustified and pedagogically unwise, in that it 
risks alienating promising students from philosophy. Again, the danger of alienating 
women students may be greater than that of alienating male students, if the intuitions 
that are statistically more likely to be shared by male students are also the standard 
intuitions that are presupposed by the bulk of the philosophical literature. In other 
words, it may be women who are more likely to have ‘deviant’ intuitions: intuitions 
that differ from their teachers. 
What connects the two issues is the notion of deviance, and in particular the 
idea that it is ‘women who need to change’. Of course, women do need to change, 
inasmuch as female as well as male philosophers are well capable of contributing to 
an aggressive seminar atmosphere and dismissing their students’ intuitions as tin-
eared. But women who are on the receiving end of these phenomena do not need to 
change. There may be a powerful psychological connection between atypicality and 
deviance, but psychological connections need not correspond to objective 
connections; and where they do not, it is our thinking that needs to change. 
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